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Do Social Preferences Matter in Competitive
Markets?∗
Paul Heidhues† and Frank Riedel ‡
Abstract
Experimental evidence stresses the importance of so–called social
preferences for understanding economic behavior. Social preferences
are defined over the entire allocation in a given economic environment,
and not just over one’s own consumption as is traditionally presumed.
We study the implications for competitive market outcomes if agents
have such preferences. First, we clarify under what conditions an
agent behaves as if she was selfish—i.e. when her demand function is
independent of others’ behavior. An agent behaves as if selfish if and
only if her preferences can be represented by a utility function that
is separable between her own utility and the allocation of goods for
all other agents. Next, we study equilibrium outcomes in economies
where individual agents behave as if selfish. We show that one can
identify a corresponding ego–economy such that the equilibria of the
ego–economy coincide with the equilibria of the original economy. As
a consequence, competitive equilibria exist and they are material ef-
ficient. In general, however, the First Welfare Theorem fails. We
introduce the class of Bergsonian social utility functions, which are
social utility functions that are completely separable in all agents’
material utility. For such social preferences, the Second Welfare The-
orem holds under a suitable growth condition. We also establish that
in uncertain environments, agents with social preferences typically do
not behave as if selfish. Furthermore, in the presence of public goods,
both demand and equilibrium outcomes depend on social preferences.
∗ We thank seminar participants in Munich, Armin Falk, Klaus Schmidt, and especially
Martin Hellwig and Botond Ko˝szegi for helpful comments. †Department of Economics,
University of Bonn and CEPR; ‡Department of Economics, University of Bielefeld.
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1 Introduction
Economists assume almost exclusively that economic agents are selfish: They
attempt to maximize their material well-being ignoring the material well-
being of others in the economy. While self-interest seems one of the most
important human traits, it is also obvious that agents are not purely selfish in
the above way.1 The question of how non-selfish preferences affect the func-
tioning and desirability of market outcomes is a basic question that dates
back to at least Edgeworth’s (1881) seminal work on exchange markets,2
which among other things addressed the impact of altruistic preferences in
exchange situations. This article reconsiders these questions from the per-
spective of more recently developed social preference models, in which agents
are motivated either by altruistic or spiteful considerations, depending on the
endogenous circumstances.
The vast amount of experimental evidence demonstrating that subjects
do not behave purely selfishly has inspired a variety of ‘social preference’
models (for a survey see Sobel (2005)). Broadly, one may classify these
models into allocative social preference models in which—as in the standard
model—agents preferences are defined over outcomes. In contrast to the
standard model, however, the preferences of an agent depend not only on
the consumption vector that he receives but also on the entire allocation
in the economy (see for example Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and
Ockenfels (2000)).3 The other class of social preference models are those
in which agents, in addition, care about how a social outcome is reached.4
Throughout this article, we focus on the class of allocative social preference
models.
One of the central tenets, which are part of the ‘behavioral economics
folklore’ is that—in line with experimental evidence—social preferences do
not matter in competitive markets. For the case of allocative social prefer-
1As Adam Smith (1759)) put it “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are
evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortunes of others, and
render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the
pleasure of seeing it.”
2See also Collard (1975) for a discussion of Edgeworth results.
3 Existing allocative-social-preference models are designed for environments in which
economic agents (subjects) receive one good (money at the end of the experiment). We
propose a natural extension to multi-good environments below.
4See, for example, Rabin (1993), Levine (1998), Charness and Rabin (2002), Dufwen-
berg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
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ences, this folklore is backed by formal results in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for
a proposer-competition model. The main aim of the paper is to theoretically
analyze under what general conditions and to what extend allocative social
preference do not matter in competitive markets. We analyze this question
in the most fundamental economic market model: the perfectly competitive
exchange economy.
Conceptually, we divide our tasks into two subtasks. First, we look for
conditions on social preferences under which agents in the exchange economy
behave as if they had selfish preferences. Second, supposing that agents’
preferences satisfy these conditions, we ask whether and how the fundamental
welfare theorems extend to economies with social preferences. To the best
of our knowledge, the question under what conditions agents behave as-if
they were selfish is completely novel. Regarding the second question, we
build on results by Edgeworth (1881) Borglin (1973), Hochman and Rodgers
(1969), Rader (1980), and Winter (1969) that seem to have been somewhat
overlooked in the recent literature on social preferences.
We first clarify under what conditions an agent behaves as if she was
egoistic. We say that an agent behaves as if selfish if there exists a material
utility function defined over an agent’s own consumption level that accurately
predicts her behavior for all possible price vectors and endowments. Under
standard technical assumptions, we show that an as-if-selfish utility function
exists if and only if agent’s preferences can be represented by a utility function
that is separable between her own consumption vector and that of all others in
the following sense. There exists a functionmi(xi) and a function V i(mi, x−i)
such that the agent prefers an allocation x to an allocation y if and only if
V i
(
mi(xi), x−i
) ≥ V i (mi(yi), y−i) .
It is straightforward to see that the marginal rate of substitution is indepen-
dent of x−i if the agent has such a utility function. It is more difficult to
see, though, that as–if–selfish behavior implies the existence of such a utility
function. We rely on the classical integrability theory of demand functions
to establish this result.
This class of separable utility functions contains a very natural class of
social preferences constructed as follows: Suppose each agents derives a ma-
terial well-being mi(xi) from her own consumption. Agents get utility from
their own material well-being as well as from comparing their own material
well-being to that of others (which allows to incorporate altruistic, spiteful,
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efficiency, fairness and reciprocity considerations into an agent’s preferences).
Then, if an agent aggregates the material well-being of others using their
material preferences and every agents material preferences satisfy standard
assumptions, an agent i’s preferences can be represented by a “Bergsonian
utility function” of the form Ui(m
1, ...,mN) , where mj is the material well-
being of agent j. These utility functions are separable and represent a natural
extension of the allocative social preference models mentioned above. Nev-
ertheless, this rules out certain type of interdependent preferences that may
be economically important. Suppose, for example, each agent cares about
status and status is allocated according to relative consumption of good 1.
While our general formulation of social preferences would allow for such type
of preferences, the more specific Bergsonian social preferences do not. The
class of Bergsonian social preferences, however, does contain the natural gen-
eralization of the recent inequity-aversion models to multi-good environments
in which inequity is defined over the material well-being of the agents in the
exchange economy.
Restricting attention to this class of Bergsonian social preferences, we can
use existing results for standard competitive models to show that a Walrasian
equilibrium exists. While the Walrasian equilibrium is materially efficient—
in the sense that it is impossible to make one agent materially better of with-
out making another agents materially worse of—, the competitive allocation
is not necessarily Pareto-efficient. In other words, the First Fundamental
Welfare Theorem fails. We provide a simple example in which agents are
altruistic and in which only a subset of the materially efficient allocations is
Pareto-efficient. Intuitively, if an altruistic agent becomes too rich relative to
others, she may be willing to sacrifice some of her own consumption in order
to help others. If this is case, such a redistribution can make both herself and
others better off—i.e. there is scope for Pareto-improving redistribution.5
We also establish through an example that Pareto-efficient allocations
need not be materially efficient. In this somewhat pathological example,
each agent hates his fellow agent so much that she is better of if both agents
receive less, and thus a Pareto-efficient solution is for both agents to consume
nothing, which is obviously not materially efficient. We then introduce a
simple “growth condition” that rules out such pathological examples. The
condition requires an agent to be better off if all agents material well-being
5Our example is in the spirit of those in Edgeworth (1881, p. 51) and Hochman and
Rodgers (1969).
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is proportionally increased. Under this mild condition, all Pareto-efficient
allocations are materially efficient, and hence the Second Welfare Theorem
prevails. That the Second Welfare Theorem holds, has been established by
Winter (1969) for the case of separable social preferences that are (weakly)
altruistic and increasing in an agent’s own material well-being. It has been
extended by Borglin (1973) and Rader (1980) to the class of separable social
preferences that allow for both spitefulness and altruism.
We then introduce uncertainty into our exchange economy and show that,
in general, Bergsonian social preferences matter for behavior in the presence
of uncertainty. Technically, the reason is that even though a Bergsonian social
utility function is separable ex post, it is not separable across agents from an
ex-ante point of view. To understand why, suppose there are two states of
nature and consider an agent whose utility depends on her material well-being
and on the comparison to a given fellow consumer. Suppose further that she
gets disutility from a social comparison to her fellow agent, if and only if he
is materially better of than she is and let this disutility be increasing in the
distance between their material well-being. Now, for a given endowment and
price vector, consider the consumption bundle that maximizes her material
well-being. If her fellow agent consumes strictly more than her in state one
and less than her in state two, her utility increases when she shifts some
consumption from state two to state one. Since she started at a materially
optimal consumption bundle, such a redistribution has only a second-order
effect on her material well-being. But it has a first-order effect in reducing
the disutility she suffers from the social comparison. Hence, agents with
social preferences do not behave as if selfish in the presence of uncertainty.
We also show, however, that if there is no aggregate risk in the economy and
agents are risk averse, a selfish equilibrium remains an equilibrium under a
relatively mild condition if we allow for Bergsonian social preferences. The
reason is that in the selfish equilibrium, agents are fully insured and the
social comparisons are perfectly identical in all realized states of nature.
We then show that social preferences are important in the presence of
a public good. Consider an economy inhabited by purely selfish agents in
which agent i contributes to the provision of a public good. If agent i is purely
selfish, she will contribute up to the point at which her personal sacrifice in
private consumption from contributing an extra unit is equal to her personal
benefit from contributing an extra unit. Now consider this outcome and
suppose that agent i becomes altruistic. In this case, if she contributes an
extra unit to the public good, this has a second-order effect on her own
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material well-being. The extra unit of the public good, however, increases
the material well-being of all other agents in the economy. Hence, if agent i
is altruistic, increasing her contributions has positive first-order effect on her
utility. Thus, agent i will not behave as if she was selfish in a public goods
economy.
Most closely related to our paper is recent (independent) work by So-
bel (2007). Among a variety of market institutions, Sobel also analyzes an
exchange economy. When considering an exchange economy, he assumes
additive separability of preferences and focuses on the question under what
conditions the usual price-taking assumption is justified as an approximation
of a large finite economy in which agents have social preferences. In contrast
to Sobel, we take the price taking assumption as given and focus on the nec-
essary and sufficient assumptions for individuals with social preferences to
behave as if selfish. Furthermore, in contrast to Sobel, we formally discuss
the impact of uncertainty and public goods. In addition, we reconsider the
fundamental welfare theorems.
In Section 2, we introduce allocative social preferences into an otherwise
standard exchange economy and characterize under what conditions an agent
behaves as if she was selfish in a perfectly competitive market. Section 3
discusses properties of exchange economies with separable social preferences
and Section 4 reconsiders the fundamental welfare theorems when agents
have Bergsonian social preferences. Section 5 shows that even Bergsonian
social preferences will typically matter for predicting behavior if we introduce
uncertainty or a public good into our exchange economy. Concluding remarks
are contained in Section 5.
2 Exchange Economy with Social Prefer-
ences
This section introduces a standard exchange economy in which consumers
have preferences over allocations. We then define selfish preferences as ones in
which an agent cares only about the consumption vector she receives and not
about what others receive. In contrast, we say she has social preferences if her
well-being is also influenced by what others receive. Intuitively, this allows for
a wide variety of social comparisons. For example, an agent may be spiteful:
Taking her own consumption as given, she prefers her fellow agents to receive
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as little as possible. On the other hand, she may be generous or altruistic and
prefer her fellow agent to receive as much as possible. She may dislike certain
outcomes because they are inequitable in line with theories developed by Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). She may be envious
or interested in status, which could depend on the (absolute or relative)
consumption level of a given status good. She may also compare herself only
with some of her fellow agents, so that her well-being depends on what these
agents receive, or she may care about the efficiency of allocations—in line
with Charness and Rabin (2002) and the example in Edgeworth (1881).
Consider the following exchange economy. There are L ≥ 2 commodities.
A consumption bundle is a vector (x1, . . . , xL) ∈ RL+. Consumers i = 1, . . . , I
enter the market with an endowment ei ∈ RL+. e =
(
e1, . . . , eI
)
is the initial
endowment vector and e¯ =
∑I
i=1 e
i is aggregate endowment. An allocation is
a vector x =
(
x1, . . . , xI
) ∈ RIL+ . Sometimes it is convenient to write (xi, x−i)
for an allocation, where x−i are the consumption bundles of all agents other
than i.
Consumer i has a preference relation over allocations x, which we denote
by i.6 We assume that the consumers’ preference relations are complete
and transitive.7 To ensure that each consumer’s preference relation i can
be represented by a utility function U i(x) defined on the consumption set RIL+ ,
we will assume that i is continuous unless specified otherwise.8 We assume
that agent i’s preferences are strictly convex over her own consumption, i.e.
that for all x−i and for all xi 6= yi, (xi, x−i) i (yi, x−i) implies that (αxi+(1−
α)yi, x−i) i (yi, x−i) for all α ∈ (0, 1). This does not require strict convexity
over allocations, which would be far more stringent. For example, strict
convexity over allocations would rule out that an agent is only interested
in the consumption bundle she receives, because an appropriate change in
the consumption bundle of a fellow agent would have to make her better of.
Indeed, if one loosely thinks of a convex redistribution as making the other
individual agent better of, agent i may be jealous and, hence, worse off if
she has social preferences. We, therefore, only require strict convexity of
6We could allow a consumers preference relation to depend on the initial endowment,
which would only require minor notational changes below.
7Completeness requires that for all allocations x and x′, either x i x′ or x′ i x.
Transitivity presumes that for all allocations x, x′, x′′, if x i x′ and x′ i x′′, then
x i x′′.
8A preference relation is continuous if for any sequence of pairs {xn, x′n} with xn i
(x′)n for all n, limn→∞xn i limn→∞(x′)n.
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preferences over an agents own consumption bundles.
A price is a a vector p ∈ RL+. For a given price p and income wi > 0, the
budget set of consumer i is given by
Bi =
{
x ∈ RL+ : px ≤ wi
}
.
We restrict attention to strictly positive income and price levels in the fol-
lowing, to ensure that the budget set for each agent is always compact. As
long as we analyze individual behavior alone, we take the income wi > 0 as
given. For equilibrium considerations, wi = pei is endogenous, of course.9
To analyze whether social preferences matter in an exchange economy, we
begin by defining selfish preferences. We say that an agent’s preferences are
selfish whenever her evaluation of social outcomes is completely self-centered;
i.e. her ranking of any two allocations depends only on the consumption
bundle she receives in those allocations.
Definition 1 Preferences i of agent i are selfish if for all allocations x =(
x1, . . . , xI
)
and y =
(
y1, . . . , yI
)
we have(
xi, x−i
) i (yi, x−i)
if and only if (
xi, y−i
) i (yi, y−i) .
It is immediate that the utility function U i(x) of a selfish agent does not
depend on the consumption choice of other agents, i.e. one can choose U i
such that it is independent of x−i.
Whenever an agent’s preferences are not-selfish, we say that the agent has
social preferences. One central question that this paper addresses is whether
agents in perfectly competitive markets behave “as if” they had selfish pref-
erences. To do so, we compare observable implications of preferences, i.e. de-
mand behavior. Since agents preferences can be represented by a continuous
utility function and the budget set is compact, the demand correspondence
exists. Because we furthermore assumed that an agent’s preferences over
her own consumption bundles are strictly convex, each agent has a demand
function given by
di
(
p, wi;x−i
)
= arg max
pxi≤wi
U i(x) .
9Here, px denotes the usual scalar product in RL: px =
∑L
l=1 plxl.
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Note that the demand function depends on the consumption choice of other
agents x−i in general.
Definition 2 Agent i behaves as if selfish if her demand function
di (p, wi;x−i) is independent of x−i.
Next, we characterize agents who behave as if selfish. Intuitively, so-
cial preferences do not matter for an individual’s choices if for a given in-
come and price vector, she chooses the same consumption bundle irrespec-
tive of the consumption bundles of others. Suppose that her preferences are
monotone in her own consumption bundle—so that she always spends her
entire endowment—and suppose for a moment that her preferences can be
represented by a differentiable utility function. Then, at the optimal con-
sumption bundle, her marginal rate of substitution is equal to the relative
price of any two commodities. Now, holding her initial endowment as well as
the price vector fixed, change the consumption bundles that others receive.
Behaving as if selfish requires that the agent chooses the same consump-
tion bundle as before. For this consumption bundle to still be optimal, her
marginal rate of substitution between any two commodities must remain un-
changed. It is easy to see that if the agent has a utility function that is
separable in own consumption—i.e. can be represented by a utility function
V i(mi(xi), x−i)—then her marginal rate of substitution is independent of x−i
since in this case
MRSikl =
∂U i(x)
∂xik
∂U i(x)
∂xil
=
∂V i(mi(xi),x−i)
∂mi
∂mi(xi)
∂xik
∂V i(mi(xi),x−i)
∂mi
∂mi(xi)
∂xil
=
∂mi(xi)
∂xik
∂mi(xi)
∂xil
.
The proof of the theorem below generalizes the above argument to allow for
V i to be non-differentiable as is typically the case in inequity-aversion models
such as Fehr and Schmidt.
The theorem also establishes the more difficult and deeper converse—that
if an agent behaves as if selfish then her preferences can be represented by a
separable utility function—under the assumptions of local non-satiation and
continuously differentiable demand. To see why non-satiation is needed for
the converse statement, consider the two-good case and suppose agent i has a
bliss point at (1, 1). Furthermore, suppose agent i has non-selfish preferences
but that changes in x−i only affect her utility function in the quadrant to
the north-east of (1, 1). Independent of his initial endowment and the price
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level, agent i never chooses a consumption bundle in this region beyond her
bliss point and, hence, preference changes in this region are irrelevant for
her consumption choice. But this implies that we cannot conclude from the
agents observed as if selfish behavior that his utility function does not change
in such irrelevant regions and, therefore, the converse statement is not true
in this case.
Theorem 1 1. Suppose that agent’s preferences can be represented in the
form
V i
(
mi(xi), x−i
)
for a strictly quasiconcave, continuous function mi : RL → R and a
function V i : D ⊆ R × R(I−1)L → R that is increasing in its first
variable. Then agent i behaves as if selfish.
2. Suppose that agent i’s preferences are locally non–satiated and smooth
enough such that the demand function di(p, w;x−i) is continuously dif-
ferentiable10 in (p, w). If agent i behaves as if selfish, then her prefer-
ences can be represented in the form
V i
(
mi(xi), x−i
)
for a strictly quasiconcave, continuous function mi : RL → R and a
function V i : D ⊆ R × R(I−1)L → R that is increasing in its first
variable.
Proof : We prove 1. first. As m is continuous and strictly quasiconcave,
the standard utility maximization problem
max
x≥0,pxi≤w
m(xi)
has a unique solution di(p, w) for p 0 and w > 0. Obviously, this standard
demand function does not depend on x−i. Now take any x−i. We have for
all budget–feasible xi
m(xi) ≤ m(di(p, w)) .
10 A sufficient condition for this is that preferences are C 2 in own consumption without
critical points, and that the bordered Hessian of U is nonzero at all x. See Mas-Colell
(2001), Chapter 2 or Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995), Chapter 3, Appendix.
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As V (m,x−i) is increasing in m, it follows that
V
(
m
(
xi
)
, x−i
) ≤ V (m (di(p, w)) , x−i) .
Thus, di(p, w) also maximizes utility for agent i. In particular, her demand
function is independent of x−i; in other words, she behaves as if selfish.
Now consider the more difficult converse 2. Let d(p, w) be the demand
function of agent i which, by assumption, does not depend on x−i. In a first
step, we construct a (material) utility function on the consumption set RL+
of agent i. This is a standard integrability problem. Such a function m(xi)
exists if
• d is continuously differentiable,
• homogenous of degree zero,
• d has a symmetric and negative semidefinite Slutsky substitution ma-
trix,
• d satisfies Walras’ law: pd(p, w) = w for all p 0 and w > 0.
By assumption, d is continuously differentiable. As demand d is derived from
utility maximization (albeit with an additional parameter x−i), homogeneity
of degree zero and negative semidefiniteness of the substitution matrix hold
true as well. Walras’ law follows from local nonsatiation. We can then apply
an integrability theorem of Hurwitz and Uzawa (1971) to obtain a material
utility function m(xi) that rationalizes xi. In particular, we have for all x−i
that
U(xi, x−i) ≥ U(zi, x−i)⇔ m(xi) ≥ m(zi) (xi, zi ∈ RL+) . (1)
We can thus define a function V (µ, x−i) on the image of m and R(I−1)L+ by
setting
V (µ, x−i) = U(xi, x−i)
for some xi with m(xi) = µ. Note that this definition does not depend on
the particular xi chosen as we have U(xi, x−i) = U(zi, x−i) for all xi, zi with
m(xi) = m(zi) by Equation (1).
Finally, we have to show that V is increasing in µ. Let µ > ν for two
numbers µ, ν in the image ofm. Choose xi, zi with µ = m(xi) and ν = m(zi).
We then get from m(xi) > m(zi) and (1) that
U(xi, x−i) > U(zi, x−i) .
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By definition of V , this is equivalent to
V (µ, x−i) > V (ν, x−i) .
Thus, V is increasing in its first variable.
2
From now on, we call preferences separable if and only if they can be
represented in the form
V i
(
mi(xi), x−i
)
for a strictly quasiconcave, continuous function mi : RL → R and a function
V i : D ⊆ R× R(I−1)L → R that is increasing in its first variable.
If a consumer i has separable preferences, mi(xi) specifies what consump-
tion bundles a consumer prefers to others. Below, we refer to the function
mi(xi) as a consumers material payoff function. Loosely speaking, we think
of this function as a measure of the consumer’s well-being absent any social
comparisons.
In the class of all social preferences, as–if–selfish behavior is quite restric-
tive as it requires a certain separability for the representing utility functions.
It is thus intuitive that the class of separable social preferences is non-generic
in the class of social preferences.11 It would be wrong, however, to conclude
that separable preferences are an unreasonable assumption. Note that tech-
nically, of course, selfish preferences are also non-generic in the bigger class
of social preferences. Below, we will introduce a subclass of separable so-
cial preferences that naturally generalizes recent social preferences models to
multi-good environments.
3 Equilibrium with Separable Social Prefer-
ences
We now briefly introduce the concepts necessary to define efficiency and equi-
librium in an economy in which agents have separable social preferences. We
will also define a hypothetical economy in which all agents have correspond-
ing selfish preferences in order to formally investigate the implications of
social preferences for behavior and welfare.
11A formal proof of this is available upon request.
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An allocation x is called feasible if
∑I
i=1 x
i
l ≤ e¯l for all commodities
l = 1, . . . , L. A feasible allocation x is efficient if there is no other feasible
allocation y that makes every consumer better off in terms of utility, that is,
with U i (yi) > U i (xi) for all i = 1, . . . , I. A feasible allocation x is material
efficient if there is no other feasible allocation y that makes every consumer
better off in terms of material payoffs, that is, with mi (yi) > mi (xi) for all
i = 1, . . . , I.
An Walrasian equilibrium consists of a price vector p and a feasible al-
location x such that every consumer maximizes his utility given prices p,
others’ material payoffs, and endowment e, that is, for all i = 1, . . . , I and
y ∈ RL+ we have
if U i (y) > U i (x) then py > pxi .
An economy E is fully described by a tuple (I, e, (U i)) of agents, endow-
ments, and preferences. We denote the set of Walrasian equilibria of an
economy E by WE(E ), i.e.
WE(E ) = {(p, x) | (p, x) is a Walrasian equilibrium of E }.
To understand the role of social preferences, we will often compare an econ-
omy E to its corresponding hypothetical ’ego-economy’ E ego = (I, e, (mi)).
In an ego-economy each agent has the same endowment and material prefer-
ences as in the original economy E . In the ego-economy, however, all agents
are purely selfish, i.e. their preferences are not affected by comparisons to
others.
Having defined an economy, an immediate corollary of Theorem 1 is that:
Corollary 1 Suppose that all agents have separable preferences. Then the
set of Walrasian equilibria of an economy E coincides with the set of Wal-
rasian equilibria of its corresponding ego-economy E ego.
In particular, if the ego–economy E ego satisfies the usual conditions of
General Equilibrium Theory, an equilibrium exists in the economy E .12
12The standard conditions that ensure existence are the following. First, wealth of
agents must always be positive, i.e. we need a cheaper point condition. Here, ei  0
would be enough. Furthermore, a boundary condition is needed when some prices tend to
zero. For example, if pn → p 6= 0, but pl = 0 for some commodities l, one might require
that demand for some commodity tends to infinity, i.e.
max
l=1,...,L
dil(pn)→∞ .
Strict monotonicity of mi would be enough to ensure this.
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In the above sense, social preferences do not matter in competitive mar-
kets. If all agents’ preferences are separable in their own consumption bundles
and all agents’ prefer to spend their entire wealth, concerns such as envy, fair-
ness or inequity aversion that are captured in social preferences are irrelevant
for positive predictions on market outcomes.
It is perhaps worth emphasizing that the above Corollary requires not only
separability but also that every agent i’s preferences are locally non-satiated,
which rules out, for example, that an agent who is very well-off chooses not
to consume all of her income in order to reduce inequality in society. In
this sense, the requirement of local non-satiation limits the inequity concerns
that agents are allowed to have. The following result shows that local non-
satiation is needed, as otherwise, the set of Walrasian equilibria with social
preferences differs from the set of Walrasian equilibria of the ego-economy.
Corollary 2 Suppose that all agents have separable preferences. Consider
an economy E and a Walrasian equilibrium (p∗, x∗) of its corresponding ego-
economy E ego. If for some agent i, ∂V
i
∂mi
(mi(xi), (x∗)−i) < 0 at (xi = (x∗)i),
then (p∗, x∗) is not a Walrasian equilibrium of the economy E .
Another consequence of Theorem 1 is that equilibrium allocations are
material efficient.
Corollary 3 (Modified First Welfare Theorem) Suppose that all
agents have separable preferences. A Walrasian equilibrium allocation is
material efficient.
Proof : This follows directly from Corollary 1, as a Walrasian equilibrium
of E is also a Walrasian equilibrium of E ego. Apply the classical First Welfare
Theorem. 2
Note that the Corollary does not claim that every Walrasian equilibrium
is efficient. Indeed, we show in the next section that this is not the case.
Corollary 4 (Modified Second Welfare Theorem) Suppose that all
agents have separable preferences. Every material efficient allocation is a
Walrasian equilibrium for an appropriate choice of initial endowments.
Proof : This follows directly from Corollary 1, as a Walrasian equilibrium
of E is also a Walrasian equilibrium of E ego. Apply the classical Second
Welfare Theorem. 2
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4 Bergsonian Social Preferences and Welfare
From the preceding section, we know that an agent with social preferences
behaves as if selfish if and only if one can represent her preferences by a util-
ity function of the form V i(mi(xi), x−i) that separates her own consumption
of others’ consumption. A natural subclass that is economically meaningful
separates even further the other agents. Below, we emphasize the class of
Bergsonian social preferences, which is a class of social preferences in which
each agent’s preferences respect the other agents’ preferences for their own
consumption bundles. Technically, we construct this class of preferences as
follows: Consumer i derives a material payoff mi (xi) from consuming the
bundle xi, which captures the utility a consumer derives from consumption
absent any social comparisons. A consumer’s overall utility, however, de-
pends on this material utility as well as the comparison to the material
well-being of others. If a consumer has Bergsonian social preferences, she
evaluates the material well-being of a fellow consumer by aggregating his
material well-being in exactly the same way he does, and then comparing
her material well-being to his. Formally, the social preferences of consumer
i are represented by a function V i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
, where mi are the material
payoffs of the I consumers. At times, it is more convenient to write the
utility as V i (mi,m−i), to emphasize that the material payoffs of others are
taken as given by consumer i when she maximizes her utility.
In recent allocative social preference models, economic agents receive one-
dimensional payoffs (monetary rewards in experiments) and agents overall
utility depends on ones own monetary reward as well as comparisons to the
monetary rewards of others. In the class of Bergsonian social preferences, the
monetary reward is replaced with an agents material well-being, which seems
to us the natural generalization of these social preference models. Thus, for
example, the allocative social preference model of Fehr and Schmidt gener-
alizes to13
V i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
= mi − σi 1
I − 1
∑
j 6=i
(mj −mi)+ − ρi 1
I − 1
∑
j 6=i
(mi −mj)+,
where Fehr and Schmidt assume that σi ≥ ρi ≥ 0 and ρi < 1. The first
parameter assumption ensures that agents suffer more from being behind
then they gain from being ahead. In the context of a single good and linear
13In this paper (·)+ denotes the indicator function.
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material well-being assumptions, ρi < 1 ensures that the utility function
is monotonically increasing in ones own material well-being. Similarly, the
model of Bolton and Ochenfels generalize to
V i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
= mi − σi
∣∣∣∣∣mi −
∑
j m
j
I
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
where 0 ≤ σi < 1. Finally, the social-welfare preferences proposed in Char-
ness and Rabin14 simplify to
V i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
= (1− λi)mi + λi
[
δimin{m1, . . . ,mI}+ (1− δi)
I∑
j=1
mj
]
.
Intuitively, one may think of an agent as being maximizing the combination
of his own well-being and a given social welfare function. Indeed, the model
of Charness and Rabin can be viewed as extending Edgeworth’s example in
which
V i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
= (1− λi)mi + λi
[
I∑
j=1
mj
]
by adding a Rawlsian type concern for the worst of to this social welfare
function.
Of course, the above extensions of the recent allocative social preference
models ignore some thorny issues when moving from simple laboratory en-
vironments to a general equilibrium model. In particular, in the laboratory
subjects typically compare their well-being to that of other subjects. The ref-
erence group for social comparisons in our general equilibrium environment,
however, may be a strict subset of the population. Or people may have dif-
ferent types of social preferences regarding different subjects. Our general
setup with a Bergsonian social welfare function, however, allows agents to
compare themselves to arbitrary subsets of the population. What we im-
plicitly rule out, however, is that a person’s social comparisons depend on
the consumption bundle she chooses.15 Also, the above extensions restrict
14Charness and Rabin extend their model to incorporate reciprocity. In a large anony-
mous market-place, however, reciprocity presumably plays no significant role in determin-
ing behavior.
15von Siemens (2006) considers this possibility in a labor market context in which some
agents are inequity averse and compare their earnings only to the earnings of coworkers
that are employed in the same firm.
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attention to the case in which agents aggregate their fellow agents’ material
well-being according to their fellow agents’ material utility functions. As we
have shown, such a strong assumption is not needed for the result that indi-
viduals behave as if selfish but we make use of it below when considering the
welfare properties of market outcomes.
For the remainder of the paper, we assume that agents have Bergsonian
social preferences as defined above, i.e. they have material payoff functions
mi(xi) for own consumption and an aggregator
V i : RI → R
such that their utility function can be written in the form
U i(x1, . . . , xI) = V i(m1(x1), . . . ,mI(xI)) .
Moreover, we make the standard assumption that mi is increasing: the ma-
terial well–being of an agent increases when she consumes more.
Corollary 3 proves that a Walrasian equilibrium allocation is material
efficient. We next show that a Walrasian equilibrium, however, need not be
Pareto-efficient. To do so, we provide an example in the spirit of Edgeworth,
which establishes that materially efficient allocations need not be efficient.
Example 1 Altruism Requires Redistribution for Pareto Efficiency.
Consider an economy with two altruists who have V 1(m1,m2) = m1+0.9m2,
V 2(m1,m2) = 0.9m1 + m2. Suppose that their material payoff functions
are identical, m1(x1, x2) = m
2(x1, x2) = (x1x2)
1/3 and that the aggregate
endowment e = (2, 2). Then the materially efficient allocations (x1, x2) lie
on the diagonal and satisfy x1 = (α, α) for some α ∈ [0, 2]. It is easy to check
that the materially efficient allocations at the boundary of the Edgeworth box
are not efficient. Indeed, for x1 = (2, 2) and x2 = (0, 0), utility is 41/3 ' 1.59
for agent 1 and approximately 1.43 for agent 2. If agent 1 gives some amount
of both commodities to agent 2, both are better off because the marginal utility
of agent 2 is infinite whereas agent 1’s marginal utility is finite. Here, utility
for the allocations x1 = (1.9, 1.9) and x2 = (0.1, 0.1) is U1 ' 1.73 and
U2 '= 1.60.
Efficient allocations solve the problem of maximizing the weighted util-
ity λU1(x1, x2) + (1 − λ)U2(x1, x2) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Somewhat tedious
calculations show that the efficient allocations have
α =
2(λ+ 9)3
19(3λ2 − 3λ+ 91) .
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Approximately, α must be between 0.84 and 1.16.
While in this example the addition of a simple charity option would suffice
to reestablish Pareto-efficiency, in general this is not the case because of
potential free-rider problems in redistribution.16
We next show that the set of efficient allocations may not be included in
the set of materially efficient allocations.
Example 2 Hateful Society. Consider an economy with two identical
agents with utility functions V i = mi − 2mj, where mi(xi) = (xi1 xi2)
1
2 and
i 6= j. Let the aggregate endowment be e = (1, 1). The allocation ((0, 0), (0, 0)),
which is obviously not material efficient as none of the endowment is con-
sumed, is Pareto efficient.17 In this hateful society, it is impossible to make
agent 1 better of without making agent 2 worse of. Clearly, therefore, the
set of Pareto efficient allocations is not a subset of the materially efficient
allocations.
To rule out such pathological cases, we introduce a weak regularity con-
dition on social preferences. The condition requires an agent’s utility to
increase if everyone get proportionally better off and is satisfied by all social
preference models discussed above.
Condition 1 A proportional increase in material well-being makes all in-
dividuals better of, i.e. for all λ > 1 one has U i
(
λm1, . . . , λmI
)
>
U i
(
m1, . . . ,mI
)
.
Under the above sufficient condition, Pareto-efficient allocations must be
materially efficient. Intuitively, the condition ensures that if an outcome is
not materially efficient then in the set of allocations in which all agents are
materially better of, there exists an element in which the material gains are
divided between all agents in such a way that everyone is better off. Indeed,
one could slightly weaken the above condition by just requiring the existence
of one such element.18 The above condition, however, is easy to interpret
and covers the class of preferences we are especially interested in.
16For an example, see Winter (1969)
17If the endowment cannot be destroyed, then the edge of the Edgeworth box are the
set of Pareto efficient allocations, while the diagonal is the set of materially efficient allo-
cations.
18Rader (1980) uses such a slightly weaker condition.
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Theorem 2 Suppose Condition 1 holds. Then the set of Pareto-efficient
allocations is a subset of the set of materially-efficient allocations.
Proof : Note that the (continuous) material payoff functions are bounded
on the compact set of feasible allocations. Hence, we can assume without
loss of generality that they are strictly positive.
Assume that there exists a Pareto-efficient allocation x that is not mate-
rially efficient. Hence, there exists a feasible allocation y such that mi(yi) >
mi(xi) for all i. Let λi := mi(yi)/mi(xi) and note that λ := mini λ
i > 1, as
the number of agents is finite. Without loss of generality, λ1 = λ. Denote by
1 the vector in RL+ that has 1 in every component. Define a new allocation
z by setting z1 = y1, and zj = yj − j1 where j > 0, j = 2, . . . , I is chosen
such that mj(zj) = λmj(xj). The allocation z is obviously feasible as we
have
∑
j z
j ≤ ∑j yj. Moreover, mi(zi) = λmi(xi) for all i. Condition 1,
however, implies that x Pareto-dominates x, a contradiction. 2
An immediate consequence of the above theorem is the Second Welfare
Theorem.
Corollary 5 (Second Welfare Theorem) Suppose condition 1 holds.
Then every Pareto-efficient allocation can be achieved as a Walrasian equi-
librium by using suitable lump–sum transfers.
Proof : Since every materially efficient allocation can be implemented
under Condition 1 and the set of Pareto-efficient allocation is a subset of the
set of materially efficient payoffs, the result follows. 2
Following the example of Edgeworth (1881), Example 1 considers altruis-
tic preferences in which the payoff to different agents was substitutable. We
will consider an example with complementary altruism below.
Example 3 Substitutable and Complementary Altruism. A
Bergsonian agent can view the material payoff of others as a substitute or
as a complement for his own payoff. This example treats the cases of perfect
substitutes and perfect complements. As in Example 1, let material payoff
functions be mi(x1, x2) = (x1x2)
1/3, and aggregate endowment e¯ = (2, 2).
1. Perfect substitutes. Continuing Example 1, we now solve explicitly
for the set of Pareto optima. Efficient allocations solve the problem
of maximizing the weighted utility λU1(x1, x2) + (1 − λ)U2(x1, x2) for
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some λ ∈ [0, 1]. Somewhat tedious calculations (see maple–sheet ineffi-
ciency.mws) show that the efficient allocations have
α =
2(λ+ 9)3
19(3λ2 − 3λ+ 91) .
Approximately, α must be between 0.84 and 1.16.
2. Perfect complements. Let
V 1(m1,m2) = min
{
m1, βm2
}
and
V 2(m1,m2) = min
{
m2, βm1
}
for some parameter β ≥ 1. Thus, agent 1 is egoistic as long as the his
own well–being compared to the well–being of agent 2 does not exceed a
limit β ≥ 1.
The materially efficient allocations lie on the diagonal of the Edgeworth
box.
For β = 1, only the allocation (xi1, x
i
2) = (1/2, 1/2) is efficient.
More generally, efficiency requires for β > 1 that mi(xi) ≤ β mj(xj)
and that the allocation is material efficient. Thus, an efficient alloca-
tion lies on the diagonal and satisfies
1
1 + β3/2
≤ xi1 = xi2 ≤
β3/2
1 + β3/2
.
Taking the limit β →∞, we obtain (almost) the egoistic outcome. For
β =∞, all allocations on the diagonal are efficient except those at the
edges.
Example 4 Inequity Aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) suggest social
preferences of the form
V 1(m1,m2) = m1 − α(m1 −m2)+ − β(m2 −m1)+
for some parameters 0 ≤ α ≤ β < 1. We have V (λm) = λV (m). Hence, our
Condition 1 is satisfied as long as V is positive.
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This Bergsonian utility can be written as
V 1(m1,m2) = m1 − α(m1 −m1 ∧m2)− β(m2 −m1 ∧m2)
= (1− α)m1 − βm2 + (α+ β) (m1 ∧m2) .
it thus represents a mixture of hateful and complementary altruism utility
functions. Now suppose that the other agent is egoistic, V 2(m) = m2. Then
only those materially efficient allocations that make agent 1 too rich are in-
efficient.
In this example, a Pareto-inefficiency arises if the inequity–averse agent’s
material payoff is greater than that of the purely self-fish agent. The reason
is that the inequity–averse, as well as the selfish, agent is better of in this sit-
uation if parts of his consumption bundle are transferred to his fellow agent.
Observe, however, that no such opportunities for a Pareto-improvement exist
whenever the selfish agent consumes more than the inequity–averse one. The
reason is that a selfish agent is always being made worse off by consuming
less.
5 On the Impact of Bergsonian Social Prefer-
ences: Risk, Public Goods, and Intertem-
poral Choice
In this section, we illustrate that Bergsonian social preferences can play an
important role in shaping behavior in exchange economies. We view the ex-
amples below as qualifications of the benchmark result that social preferences
do not matter for predicting behavior in competitive markets.
5.1 Uncertainty
Following the usual expected utility paradigm, we consider EU Bergsonian
Utility Functions of the form
U i(x) =
S∑
s=1
pisV
i
(
m1(x1s), . . . ,m
I(xIs)
)
(2)
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for agents. Here, s = 1, . . . , S denote the states of nature, pis is the probability
for state s to occur, and V i
(
m1(x1s), . . . ,m
I(xIs)
)
is the Bergsonian utility
function we introduced above for a deterministic environment. Throughout
this section, we maintain the assumption that V i(mi,m−i) is increasing in
mi. The agents use this utility to evaluate their consumption ex post, after
uncertainty is revealed. For ease of presentation, we only present the case
in which L = 1, i.e. there is one physical good in each state of nature. The
results extend in the obvious fashion to the case of multiple physical goods
L ≥ 2. xis denotes agent i’s consumption in state s.
Natural as this formulation might be, it is not a separable utility function
ex ante. To see this informally, just consider the marginal utility between
consumption in state s > 1 and state s = 1. It is given by
pis
∂V i(m1(x1s),...,mI(xIs))
∂mi
∂mi(xis)
∂xi
pi1
∂V i(m1(x11),...,mI(xI1))
∂mi
∂mi(xi1)
∂xi
. (3)
In general, mi(xis) 6= mi(xi1), and the marginal contribution of V i does not
cancel if the aggregator function is non-linear.
Theorem 3 Suppose that agent i’s preferences can be represented by a EU
Bergsonian utility function as in (2) for smooth functions V i and mi, where
V i is strictly increasing in mi, and mi is strictly increasing and satisfies the
Inada condition ∂m
i(0)
∂xi
=∞. Suppose also that ∂2V i
∂mj∂mi
6= 0 for some j, j 6= i.
Then the agent i does not behave as if selfish.
Proof : Fix strictly positive prices p and income w and some consumption
bundles x−i for all other agents than i. Due to the Inada assumption, agent
i chooses an interior consumption bundle xi. This bundle satisfies
pis
∂V i(m1(x1s),...,mI(xIs))
∂mi
∂mi(xis)
∂xi
pi1
∂V i(m1(x11),...,mI(xI1))
∂mi
∂mi(xi1)
∂xi
=
ps
p1
.
Choose the agent j 6= i for which ∂2V i
∂mj∂mi
6= 0. Now slightly change
the consumption plan of agent j in state 1 to zj1 6= xj1 such that
∂V i(m1(x11),...,mi(zi1),...,mI(xI1))
∂mi
6= ∂V
i(m1(x11),...,mI(xI1))
∂mi
. Let zjs = x
j
s for states
s = 2, . . . , S. Also hold the consumption plans of all other agents k 6= j
fixed, i.e. let zk = xk for k 6= j. At this new allocation, the marginal rate of
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substitution of agent i is no longer equal to the price ratio. Hence, xi is no
longer the demand of agent i. 2
Hence, social preferences do matter for predicting behavior under un-
certainty. But although EU Bergsonian preferences matter for predicting
individual behavior, in an exchange economy with no aggregate uncertainty,
social preferences are irrelevant in equilibrium under a relatively mild condi-
tion. Formally, an economy under uncertainty exhibits no aggregate uncer-
tainty if the aggregate endowment
e¯ =
I∑
i=1
ei
does not depend on the states of the world s = 1, . . . , S. Under classical
EU preferences with strictly risk–averse agents, every Walrasian equilibrium
is a full insurance allocation in the sense that every agent’s consumption
bundle xi has equal consumption in every state. Intuitively, this suggests
that Bergsonian social preferences typically do not matter absent aggregate
uncertainty because in a full insurance equilibrium agents face no uncertainty.
More formally, if the material utility of all agents is the same in all states,
the marginal rate of substitution for EU Bergsonian preferences as given in
(3) is equal to the material marginal rate of substitution. It is necessary,
however, to ensure that agents with social preferences do not prefer to face
risks. The following condition ensures that agents social utility function is
concave whenever their material utility function is concave.
Condition 2 V i(αmi + (1 − α)m˜,m−i) ≥ αV i(mi,m−i) + (1 −
α)V i(m˜i,m−i), ∀mi, m˜i,m−i and α ∈ [0, 1].
The above condition is, for example, satisfied by the social preference
models of Fehr and Schmidt, Bolton and Ockenfels as well as Charness and
Rabin that we introduced above. Thus, for these models one has:
Theorem 4 Suppose that social preferences satisfy Condition 2 and that V i
is strictly increasing in mi. Consider an economy with no aggregate uncer-
tainty. Let mi be concave and let (p∗, x∗) be a full insurance equilibrium of the
ego–economy. Then (p∗, x∗) is also an equilibrium under social preferences.
Proof : In a full insurance equilibrium of the ego–economy, without loss of
generality, prices are equal to probabilities , i.e. p∗s = pis. The only thing we
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have to check is that x∗i is agent i’s demand for the EU Bergsonian utility.
Take a consumption plan y that is budget–feasible for agent i. In particular,
we have
S∑
s=1
psys =
S∑
s=1
pisys =
S∑
s=1
pisx
i
s = x
i
where we write xi = xis for the full insurance consumption plan x
i. By
Condition 2 and monotonicity of V i inmi, the EU Bergsonian utility function
U i is concave and monotone in xi. Hence,
U i(y, x∗,−i) ≤
S∑
s=1
pisU
i(x∗) = U i(x∗) .
2
To see why Condition 2 is needed consider the following example. Let
there be one consumption good in each of two states of nature that are
equally likely, and let there be two agents. Suppose material well-being of
each agent is (approximately) linear and identical across agents so that in
the selfish equilibrium the relative price is one. Let m(0) = 0. Suppose in the
selfish equilibrium agent 2 consumes 2 in each state of nature while agent 1
consumes 1 in each state of nature. Now consider social preferences of agent
1. Suppose they are of the form U1(m1,m2) = m1 − g[(m2 −m1)+], where
g(0) = 0, and 2g(1) > g(2). If agent two consumes one in each state of nature,
her expected utility is m1(1) − g(1). If the agent, however, consumes 2 in
state 1 and nothing in state 2, her utility is 1/2m1(2)− 1/2g(2). Thus, if m1
is sufficiently linear, the agent prefers the unequal consumption bundle over
the full insurance one. Intuitively, she takes a risk and bets on the realization
of state 1 in order to avoid falling behind agent 1.
With aggregate uncertainty, however, it is easy to exhibit examples where
EU social preferences that satisfy Condition 2 affect behavior. Let us also
mention that the analysis of this section carries over to intertemporal set-
tings if we impose the usual additively–separable type of intertemporal utility
functions.19
19See Gebhardt (2005) for an intertemporal-asset-economy example in which the equi-
librium allocation can be supported by a unique price vector if agents are selfish but can
be supported by a continuum of price vectors if all agents become inequity averse.
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5.2 Public Goods
We now introduce a public good into our exchange economy and show that
in such a situation social preferences are important for predicting behavior.
To intuitively understand why this is the case, consider a hypothetical ego
economy in which agent i contributes to the provision of a public good. If
agent i is purely selfish, he will contribute up to the point in which his
personal sacrifice in private consumption from contributing an extra unit is
equal to his personal benefit from contributing an extra unit. Now consider
this outcome and suppose that agent i is altruistic rather than selfish. In this
case, if he contributes an extra unit to the public good, this has a second-
order effect on his material well-being. The extra unit of the public good,
however, makes all other agents in the economy better off in terms of their
material well-being. Hence, if agent i is altruistic, this has positive first-order
effect on his utility. Thus, agent i will not behave as if he was selfish in a
public goods economy.
To formalize this intuition, suppose there are two agents and two goods.
The first good is private, whereas the second good is public. Agents can
produce the public good from the private one by using a common technology
modeled by a concave production function g. We take the private commodity
as a nume´raire. Agents are endowed with an amount ei > 0 of the private
good. There is no endowment in the public good. The agent’s utility function
is
U i(xi, x−i, y) = V i
(
mi(xi, y),m−i(x−i, y)
)
. (4)
In equilibrium, agent i chooses an amount zi to use as input for the produc-
tion of the public good. She then maximizes
V i
(
mi
(
ei − zi, y) ,m−i (e−i − z−i, y))
subject to
y = g(zi) + g(z−i) ,
while taking z−i as given.
In the ego–economy, the agent equates the marginal rate of transforma-
tion and her marginal rate of substitution, i.e.
g′(zi)
∂mi
∂y
=
∂mi
∂xi
.
Let ζ i be the optimal solution in the ego–economy.
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In the economy with social preferences, we get the first–order condition
g′(zi)
[
∂V i
∂mi
∂mi
∂y
+
∂V i
∂m−i
∂m−i
∂y
]
=
∂V i
∂mi
∂mi
∂xi
.
At the optimum of the ego–economy, the marginal utility of an agent with
social preferences is
g′(ζ i)
[
∂V i
∂mi
∂mi
∂y
+
∂V i
∂m−i
∂m−i
∂y
]
− ∂V
i
∂mi
∂mi
∂xi
= g′(ζ i)
∂V i
∂m−i
∂m−i
∂y
.
Hence, as long as the agents cares about the other agent’s utility level, she
behaves differently than her egoistic counterpart. Social preferences matter
when there are public goods. If the agent is locally altruistic, i.e.
∂V i
∂m−i
> 0 ,
then she produces more from the public good than her egoistic part would
suggest. If an agent is rather spiteful at the optimum, she produces less than
in the ego–economy. The following example makes this reasoning explicit.
Example 5 We now assume that agent 1 views the utility levels as perfect
complements whereas agent 2 is egoistic. Hence,
V 1(m1,m2) = min{m1,m2}, V 2(m1,m2) = m2 .
Agent 1 is rich: e1  e2. The poor agent then maximizes as usual, i.e.
g′(z2)
∂m2
∂x2
=
∂m2
∂x2
(
e2 − z2, g(z1) + g(z2)) .
The rich agent, however, produces just enough of the public good as to achieve
equality of utility levels:
m1(e1 − z1, y) = m2(e2 − z2, y) .
As material payoff functions are increasing, and the public good consumption
is, of course, the same for both agents, we get
e1 − z1 = e2 − z2 .
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The rich agent transfers utility through the public good. This is, however,
quite inefficient as we have
g′(z2) g′(z1) .
In fact, the social optimum here is the following. Choose a weight α > 0
and maximize
αmin{m1(x1, y),m2(x2, y)}+m2(x2, y)
subject to the constraints
x1 + x2 + z1 + z2 = e1 + e2
and
y = g(z1) + g(z2) .
It is optimal to have m1 = m2. This implies, as above, x1 = x2. Given
this, the social planner just maximizes
m2
(
(e¯− z1 − z2)/2, g(z1) + g(z2)) .
It is optimal to have
z1 = z2 = z
where z solves
1
2
g′(z)
∂m2
∂y
((e¯− 2z)/2, 2g(z)) = ∂m
2
∂x2
((e¯− 2z)/2, 2g(z)) .
Technically, one can understand why Bergsonian social preferences mat-
ter in the presence of a public good also directly from equation (4). Even
though agent i has Bergsonian social preferences, the presence of a public
good destroys the separability of his utility function. Analogously to the
case of a public good, if we consider a multi-good economy in which—say
due to environmental pollution—consumption of one good has a negative
effect on the material well-being of others, social preferences will in general
matter for predicting behavior.
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6 Conclusion
As a benchmark result, we establish that under mild regularity conditions
social preferences do not matter for predicting behavior in perfectly com-
petitive markets if each agent’s social preferences are separable in her own
consumption and that of all others. An economically meaningful subclass of
separable social preferences are Bergsonian social preferences, which contains
the natural extensions of the most important recently developed allocative
social preference models. We show that for these preferences the First Wel-
fare Theorem fails, while the Second Welfare Theorem holds.
We also point out, however, that even in this subclass of preferences,
social preferences matter in general for predicting behavior in public good
economies, in risky environments, or in intertemporal settings.
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